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The Role of Trust in Safety Management 
 
Abstract 
 
Trust has been of great interest in organisational research and it is starting to emerge 
as an important topic in safety management.  This paper provides a brief introduction 
to the concept of trust and considers the role of trust in managing safety in high 
hazard organisations.  A case is made for why trust is important in the aviation 
industry and some of the evidence linking trust to safety outcomes and worker 
behaviours is reviewed.  Recommendations for how to build trust within an 
organisational setting are made by focusing on three factors of perceived 
trustworthiness:  ability, benevolence and integrity. 
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The Role of Trust in Safety Management 
 
Introduction 
Three things are needed for government: weapons, food and trust. If a ruler can't 
hold on to all three, he should give up the weapons first and the food next. Trust 
should be guarded to the end: without trust we cannot stand  (Confucius cited in 
O'Neill, 2002, p. 1). 
 
The view of trust as a foundation for social order spans many intellectual disciplines.  
Understanding why people trust, as well as how trust shapes social relations, has been 
a central focus for psychologists (Worchel, 1979), organisational scientists (Kramer & 
Tyler, 1996), sociologists (Gambetta, 1988), political scientists (Barber, 1983), and 
economists (Axelrod, 1984).  Although the concept of trust appears in a variety of 
senses in the social sciences there is considerable debate about how to define and 
measure trust and how trust affects the behaviour of people in the workplace.  This 
paper provides a brief introduction to the topic of trust and considers the role of trust 
in managing safety in high hazard industries, specifically, the aviation industry. 
 
The Need for Trust in High Hazard Organisations 
In today’s flatter organisations, jobs often require cooperation across boundaries, such 
as functional areas, divisions, and management versus workforce lines.  Because trust 
facilitates cooperative behaviour (Gambetta, 1988), promotes adaptive organisational 
forms like network relations (Miles & Snow, 1992) and facilitates rapid formulation 
of ad hoc work groups (Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996), it is invaluable to 
organisations like those in the aviation industry that depend on cross-functional teams, 
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interorganisational partnerships, and temporary workgroups to coordinate work (e.g. 
Creed & Miles, 1996; Powell, 1990; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994).  A lack of trust can 
affect employee’s commitment to organisational goals (Handy, 1995; McAllister, 
1995) and this may include safety. 
 
It is now widely recognised that an organisation’s safety culture affects safety 
performance through safety management practices and worker safety behaviours and 
leading models of safety culture (Hudson, 2003; Reason, 1997; Westrum, 1995) have 
proposed that trust plays a central role.  For example, Reason (1997) proposed that an 
informed culture is for all intents and purposes a safety culture, and that in order to 
move towards increasing informedness, the workforce must report their errors and 
near misses.  However, in order for the workforce to do so, they must trust the 
management to treat them fairly.    Thus, in order to influence safety performance, 
managers in high hazard industries need to develop and cultivate a culture of safety 
within their organisations.  One way they can do this is by building trust between 
employees, supervisors, and managers. 
 
With respect to the aviation industry, Helmreich and Merritt (1998) have stated that 
safety cultures are built on trust (p. 175).  In aviation, trust needs to be built at several 
different levels: 
• Within and between workers (e.g. Flight deck / Cabin crew / ATC / Engineering)  
• In supervisors 
• In senior managers 
• In the organization (e.g. Airline, Airport Authority) 
• In the industry regulator 
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• In technology (e.g. TCAS vs. ATC as in the Ueberlingen accident July 2002; See 
Bennett, 2004) 
 
However, before recommendations about how to build trust in an organisational 
setting can be made, it is prudent to consider how trust has been defined and measured 
in the organisational literature and some of the evidence linking trust to safety 
performance and worker safety behaviours. 
 
Defining and Measuring Trust 
As mentioned, trust has been studied by a variety of researchers in the social sciences.  
Sometimes, these researchers have used the term “trust” when they mean other things 
and this has led to confusion about the definition and utility of trust.  For example, 
Deutsch (1958) conceptualised trust as a choice-behaviour.  He defined high trust 
behaviour as cooperation and low trust behaviour as competition.  Rousseau, Sitkin, 
Burt and Camerer (1998) argued that this has led to a blurring of the distinction 
between trust and the behavioural manifestation of trust because cooperation may 
result from a variety of reasons unrelated to trust, such as coercion (e.g. court-ordered 
compliance).  Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) have proposed an influential 
definition of trust.   They defined trust as the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to 
the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a 
particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or 
control that other party (p. 712).  Most trust researchers would now agree that trust 
involves a willingness to accept vulnerability.  Rousseau et al. (1998) conducted a 
cross-disciplinary review of definitions of trust and proposed the following widely 
accepted definition: Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
 5
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour or 
another (p. 395).  Accordingly, this paper shall adopt the above definition to consider 
the role of trust in safety management. 
 
In order to distinguish between trust, its antecedents, and outcomes, Mayer et al. 
(1995) proposed an integrative model of organisational trust that considers the 
trusting party, the party to be trusted and the perceived risk in the situation.  They 
proposed that an individual’s propensity to trust and the perceived trustworthiness of a 
given trustee (based on perceptions of ability, benevolence and integrity) may lead to 
trust (i.e. a willingness to be vulnerable).  The authors proposed that individuals 
compare the level of trust and the level of perceived risk in a situation (belief about 
likelihoods of gains or losses outside of considerations that involve the relationship 
with the particular trustee).  If trust is greater than perceived risk, an individual will 
engage in risk taking in relationship, which is the behavioural manifestation of trust.  
If perceived risk is greater than trust, an individual will not engage in trusting 
behaviour.  In other words, engaging in trusting behaviour involves a social 
judgement that results in taking a risk, whereas there is no risk taken in the 
willingness to be vulnerable (i.e. to trust). 
 
Applying Mayer et al.’s (1995) model to safety behaviours, trust between two 
employees may lead one of the employees to stop the job or challenge the other's 
potentially unsafe act or rule violation.  In this example, stopping the job / challenging 
a workmate's potentially unsafe act is trusting behaviour.  The employee who stops 
the job is taking a risk that his workmate will respond positively to his safety concerns 
and not brand him a troublemaker or worse.  But, according to Mayer et al.’s (1995) 
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model, the decision to engage in trusting behaviour (i.e. stop the job / challenge a 
workmate) is also dependent on the perceived situational risk (factors independent of 
the relationship with that workmate).  In this example, the perceived risk in the 
situation would most likely be management's response to stopping the job for safety 
reasons.  So, this model predicts that even if an employee trusts his workmate, he will 
not stop the job / challenge his workmate if the employee perceives there to be a 
greater risk of an adverse response from management about a missed deadline 
because of safety concerns.  Thus, in order for the employee to stop the job / 
challenge his workmate, he must trust both his workmate and the management's 
commitment to safety.  This example shows quite poignantly that in order to cultivate 
a culture of safety, trust must exist in different levels of the organisation.  It is not in 
itself sufficient for members of the workforce to trust each other and not trust the 
management, or even for members of the workforce to trust the management but not 
each other to foster positive safety behaviours. 
 
Trust, then is a separate construct from its antecedents (i.e. perceived trustworthiness) 
and outcomes (i.e. trusting behaviour - risk taking in relationship).  Because trust is a 
psychological state, it cannot be measured directly.  Trust, as it has been defined here, 
is best measured indirectly by questionnaire items that assess an individual’s 
willingness to be vulnerable to another party for a given set of circumstances (e.g. I 
would be willing to let top management have complete control over my future in this 
company - Mayer & Davis, 1999).  However, most researchers have used 
questionnaire items that take a more direct approach (e.g. I trust my supervisor to act 
on safety concerns - Burns, 2004; Management can be trusted to make sensible 
decisions for the firm's future - Cook & Wall, 1980). 
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 Trust, Safety Behaviours and Organisational Performance 
Although trust is central to theoretical models of safety culture, research on the effects 
of trust on safety performance is only starting to emerge (Burns, 2004; Zacharatos, 
Barling, & Iverson, In press).  In their study of high performance work systems (a 
group of separate but related human resource practices that recruit, select, develop, 
motivate, and retain employees), Zacharatos et al. (In press) cited some studies of 
high-performance work systems that resulted in trust in management (Cascio, 1993; 
Fitz-Enz, 1997).  They also noted that trust in management mediates the relationship 
between transformational leadership and follower performance (Jung & Avolio, 2000) 
then proposed that employees who are trusting of management may be more inclined 
to work in a safe manner, to look out for the safety of fellow employees and to take 
greater initiative in safety-related matters.  The authors proceeded to test the 
hypothesis that trust in management mediates the relationship between a high-
performance work system and safety incidents (incidents requiring first-aid, or near 
misses), and personal safety orientation (compliance, initiative, knowledge, 
motivation).  They found that trust in management mediates the effects of the high-
performance work system on safety incidents but not on personal safety orientation.  
The authors concluded that future research should focus on whether safety-specific 
trust in management serves a more substantial mediating role on worker safety 
attitudes and behaviours.  This is a sensible next step as trust is context-specific (i.e. 
an individual might trust someone in one situation but not in another - Mayer et al., 
1995; Zand, 1972). 
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Burns (2004) examined the relationship between safety-specific attitudes about trust 
and self-report safety behaviours.  In a study of UK oil and gas workers, he found a 
positive relationship between an individual’s safety-specific trust in a workmate (and 
supervisor) and whether that individual would challenge that workmate’s (and 
supervisor’s) unsafe act or rule violation.  He also found a positive relationship 
between an individual’s safety-specific trust in a supervisor and whether that 
individual would report an incident or safety concern that had to do with the 
supervisor.  This relationship was not observed for safety-specific trust in workmates.  
Further research needs to examine the relationship between safety-specific trust and 
safety outcomes like worker injuries and near misses but Burns’ work has started to 
provide empirical support for models of safety culture which are based on trust (e.g. 
Reason, 1997). 
 
 Studies of safety climate (workers’ attitudes and perceptions about safety) give a 
range of leading indicators about the organisation’s underlying safety culture, which 
can be used to identify potential safety problems before they are realised as accidents 
and near misses.  Despite the central role of trust in leading models of safety culture, 
literature reviews of the factors measured in safety climate surveys (Flin, Mearns, 
O'Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000) have shown that trust is rarely 
measured.  When questionnaire items about trust are included in safety climate 
surveys, it is usually just as one or two items, rather than as a complete scale.  Future 
studies of safety climate in high hazard industries should consider measuring trust in 
order to assess its effects on safety performance.  Where data have been collected 
about trust in high-hazard industries, they suggest that trust is not particularly 
pervasive.  In an investigation of the human and organisational factors in offshore 
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safety, Mearns, Whitaker, Flin, Gordon and O'Connor (2000) found that 36% of a 
sample of 789 respondents from 13 different UK offshore installations did not trust 
their offshore installation managers.  Moreover, 30% of the sample indicated that they 
did not trust their supervisors while nearly half of the sample did not trust their 
workmates to complete tasks safely and competently.  Together, these figures indicate 
that more than one third of the respondents showed a lack of trust in their work 
colleagues on offshore installations.  Mearns et al. (2000) also found that 35% of 
respondents disagreed or were ambivalent about the statement “People are willing to 
report near misses.”  Similarly, 30% of respondents disagreed or were ambivalent 
about the statement “People are willing to report accidents.”  Certainly, these findings 
are not very consistent with the requirements for engineering an effective safety 
culture (Reason, 1997), making the need to study trust ever more salient. 
 
A more established area of trust research is on the effect of teamworking.  Dirks 
(1999) investigated whether the level of trust in a group affects group performance 
and how this relationship might operate.  He noted that most trust research appears to 
position trust as a variable that has direct effects on work group processes and 
performance (i.e. when trust is increased, a group is expected to experience better 
group processes like cooperation, and better performance; when trust is decreased a 
group is expected to experience poorer group processes, and poorer performance).  
Using an experimental method, he found support for a moderating role of trust on 
group performance.  In other words, trust seemed to influence how motivation is 
converted into work group processes and performance rather than influencing these 
outcomes directly.  These findings have implications for teams in high-hazard 
industries like surgical teams and cockpit crews. 
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 With respect to surgery, Fletcher et al. (2003) assessed anaesthetists’ non-technical 
skills, which included making judgements about the competence of other team 
members.  As per Mayer et al.’s (1995) model, perceptions of ability contribute to 
perceived trustworthiness and can lead to trust.  In large teaching hospitals with 
multiple operating theatres, team members for a given operation (anaesthetists, 
surgeons, and nurses) may have little or no previous experience of working together. 
The judgement of competence that an anaesthetist makes of an unfamiliar surgeon or 
anaesthetic trainee will determine the level of trust the anaesthetist will place in that 
individual.  This may in turn, influence the anaesthetist’s risk-taking in relationship 
with that individual, in terms of monitoring the individual’s performance and 
accepting the individual’s decisions during the operation. Judging competency and 
trust is also important in aviation.  For example, pilots and air traffic controllers make 
judgements of the other’s competence using minimal communication information, 
such as tone of voice, speed to respond, and clarity of instruction. Sanne (2001) 
studied trust between air traffic controllers and pilots by analysing their radio 
communications. He found that what might appear to be redundant phrases such as 
“due to traffic” in a climb instruction or “thanks for co-operation” are in fact 
providing the necessary basis for trust and co-operation in both present and future 
interactions. 
 
Trust is starting to be linked to safety outcomes and worker behaviours in high hazard 
industries like oil and gas, medicine and aviation.  Further research needs to be 
conducted to validate more fully, models of safety culture based on trust.  However, 
alongside this research, considered attention must also be paid to how trust is built in 
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organisational settings in order that organisations can start reaping the performance 
benefits that have been associated with higher levels of trust. 
 
Building Trust in Organisations 
Many authors have argued that trust is fragile.  With respect to reporting incidents in 
the aviation industry, O'Leary and Chappell (1996) stated Trust is the most important 
foundation of a successful reporting programme, and it must be actively protected, 
even after many years of successful operation.  A single case of a reporter being 
disciplined as the result of a report could undermine trust and stop the flow of useful 
reports (p. 11).  One way to build trust within and between organisations is to take 
account of the factors of perceived trustworthiness that lead to trust, as per Mayer et 
al.’s (1995) model. 
 
As mentioned, Mayer et al. (1995) proposed that trust is determined by a trustor’s 
propensity to trust and perceptions of the trustworthiness of a given trustee.  While 
every individual has a different propensity to trust, determined by personality and past 
trusting experiences, managers can manipulate perceptions of trustworthiness so as to 
build trust in their organisations.  Mayer et al. (1995) identified three factors of 
perceived trustworthiness - ability, benevolence and integrity, which they defined as 
follows: 
 
i) Ability - that group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable a 
party to have influence within some specific domain (p. 717);  
ii) Benevolence - the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to 
the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit motive (p. 718);  
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iii)  Integrity - the trustor’s perception that the trustee adheres to a set of 
principles that the trustor finds acceptable (p. 719).   
 
Davis, Schoorman, Mayer and Tan (2000) used Mayer et al.’s (1995) model to 
investigate employees’ trust for general managers of nine chain restaurants.  The 
authors found that ability, benevolence, and integrity explained a major portion of the 
variance in trust.  A confirmatory factor analysis revealed that the three-factor model 
fitted the data well and produced a better fit than a single-factor model.  Mayer and 
Davis (1999) reported a similar factor structure for employees’ trust in the senior 
management of a plastics manufacturing firm.   These results suggest that ability, 
benevolence, and integrity are distinct factors of trustworthiness, which provide a 
solid framework from which to build trust.  
 
In terms of safety-specific trust, Burns (2004) used Mayer et al.'s (1995) three-factor 
model to investigate the antecedents of trust for workmates and supervisors, with 
respect to safety, at two UK gas plants.  These studies found strong positive 
relationships between measures of trust and perceptions of ability, benevolence and 
integrity, with respect to safety, for both workmates and supervisors.  Moreover, 
regression analyses using safety-specific items about perceived ability, benevolence 
and integrity as predictors of safety-specific trust explained much of the variance in 
trust for workmates and supervisors.  However, there were insufficient sample sizes to 
factor analyse the data, which would have determined whether ability, benevolence 
and integrity are distinct factors of trustworthiness, with respect to safety.  Thus, 
further research is needed so that a factor structure for trustworthiness, with respect to 
safety, can be confirmed. 
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 Burns (2004) also proposed that in an organisation with a fixed hierarchical structure, 
group membership in different levels of the hierarchy was an antecedent of trust.  The 
results from the studies at the two gas plants were consistent with predictions from 
theories of social categorisation (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and self-categorisation 
(Turner, 1987) in that employees trusted their workmates more than their supervisors 
and senior managers, and trusted their supervisors more than senior managers.  
According to these theories, employees trusted their workmates more than supervisors 
and senior managers because they attributed more positive perceptions of 
trustworthiness to individuals who they classified as part of the same social group (i.e. 
the other members of the workforce).  Similarly, employees trusted their supervisors 
more than senior managers because they attributed more positive perceptions of 
trustworthiness to their supervisors, who they classified as part of their work team or 
department.  However, due to the lack of a confirmed factor structure for 
trustworthiness with respect to safety, it was not possible to identify which of the 
proposed factors led to the differences in trust for workmates, supervisors, and senior 
managers.  What these findings do suggest though, is that in an organisation with a 
fixed hierarchical structure, the effect of group membership on trust is an artefact of 
how the organisation is hierarchically structured.  In these types of organisations, a 
flatter organisational structure may broaden perceptions of similar group membership 
and increase the perceived trustworthiness of individuals.  This might be achieved by 
incorporating team leaders into the workforce instead of a structure in which 
supervisors are a level of middle management.  Doing so may result in senior 
managers being perceived as closer to the workforce and may afford them greater 
opportunities to demonstrate their ability, benevolence and integrity.  Certainly, these 
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findings have implications for organisations operating in high hazard industries like 
aviation and medicine. 
 
Conclusion 
Many authors agree that trust is the foundation of an effective safety culture.  
Managers in high hazard industries, like aviation, can develop and cultivate a culture 
of safety within their organisations by building trust between employees, supervisors, 
and managers.  By acting in ways to enhance perceptions of their ability, benevolence, 
and integrity, supervisors and managers in the aviation industry can increase their 
subordinates’ perceptions of their trustworthiness.  This should lead to subordinates 
having more positive attitudes about trust for their supervisors and managers.  In turn, 
this could lead to the workforce exhibiting more positive safety behaviours, like 
reporting near misses and challenging unsafe acts, resulting in fewer occupational 
injuries and better organisational safety performance. 
 
 15
References 
 
Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books. 
Barber, B. (1983). The logic and limits of trust. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press. 
Bennett, S. (2004). The 1st July mid-air collision over Uberlingen, Germany:  A 
holistic analysis. Risk Management, 6, 1. 
Burns, C. (2004). The role of trust in safety culture. Unpublished PhD Thesis, 
University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen. 
Cascio, W. F. (1993). Downsizing:  What do we know?  What have we learned? 
Academy of Management Executive, 7, 95-104. 
Cook, J., & Wall, T. D. (1980). New work attitude measures of trust, organizational 
commitment and personal need non-fulfilment. Journal of Occupational 
Psychology, 53, 39-52. 
Creed, W. E. D., & Miles, R. E. (1996). Trust in organizations:  A conceptual 
framework linking organizational forms, managerial philosophies, and the 
opportunity costs of controls. In R. M. Kramer & T. R. Tyler (Eds.), Trust in 
organizations:  Frontiers of theory and research (pp. 16-38). Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage. 
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., Mayer, R. C., & Tan, H. H. (2000). The trusted 
general manager and business unit performance:  Empirical evidence of a 
competitive advantage. Strategic Management Journal, 21, 563-576. 
Deutsch, M. (1958). Trust and suspicion. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2, 265-279. 
Dirks, K. T. (1999). The effects of interpersonal trust on work group performance. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 84, 445-455. 
Fitz-Enz, J. (1997). The 8 practices of exceptional companies:  How great 
organizations make the most of their human assets. New York: AMACOM. 
Fletcher, G., Flin, R., McGeorge, P., Maran, N., Glavin, R., & Patey, R. (2003). 
Anaesthetists' non-technical skills (ANTS):  Evaluation of a behavioural 
marker system. British Journal of Anaesthesia, 90, 580-588. 
Flin, R., Mearns, K., O'Connor, P., & Bryden, R. (2000). Measuring safety climate:  
Identifying the common features. Safety Science, 34, 177-192. 
Gambetta, D. (1988). Trust:  Making and breaking cooperative relations. New York: 
Basil Blackwell. 
Guldenmund, F. W. (2000). The nature of safety culture:  A review of theory and 
research. Safety Science, 34, 215-257. 
Handy, C. (1995). Trust and the virtual organization. Havard Business Review, 73, 
40-50. 
Helmreich, R., & Merritt, A. (1998). Culture at work in aviation and medicine. 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Hudson, P. (2003). Applying the lessons of high risk industries to health care. Quality 
and Safety in Health Care, 12(Suppl 1), i7-i12. 
Jung, D. I., & Avolio, B. J. (2000). Opening the black box:  An experimental 
investigation of the mediating effects of trust and value congruence on 
transformational and transactional leadership. Journal of Organizational 
Behavior, 21, 949-964. 
Kramer, R. M., & Tyler, T. R. (Eds.). (1996). Trust in organizations:  Frontiers of 
theory and research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 16
 17
Mayer, R. C., & Davis, J. H. (1999). The effect of the performance appraisal system 
on trust for management:  A field quasi-experiment. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 84, 123-136. 
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of 
organizational trust. Academy of Management Review, 20, 709-734. 
McAllister, D. (1995). Affect- and cognition-based trust as foundations for 
interpersonal cooperation in organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 
38, 24-59. 
Mearns, K., Whitaker, S., Flin, R., Gordon, R., & O'Connor, P. (2000). Benchmarking 
human and organisational factors in offshore safety ( No. Report 2000 036). 
London: HSE OTO. 
Meyerson, D., Weick, K. E., & Kramer, R. M. (1996). Swift trust and temporary 
groups. In R. M. Kramer & T. R. Tyler (Eds.), Trust in organizations:  
Frontiers of theory and research (pp. 166-195). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Miles, R. E., & Snow, C. C. (1992). Causes of failure in network organizations. 
California Management Review, 34, 53-72. 
O'Leary, M., & Chappell, S. L. (1996). Confidential incident reporting systems create 
vital awareness of safety problems. ICAO Journal, 51, 11-13. 
O'Neill, O. (2002). A question of trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Powell, W. W. (1990). Neither market nor hierarchy:  Network forms of organization. 
In B. M. Straw & L. L. Cummings (Eds.), Research in organization behavior 
(Vol. 12, pp. 295-336). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Reason, J. (1997). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Aldershot: 
Ashgate. 
Ring, P. S., & Van de Ven, A. H. (1994). Developmental processes of cooperative 
interorganizational relationships. Academy of Management Review, 19, 90-
118. 
Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. (1998). Not so different 
after all:  A cross-discipline view of trust. Academy of Management Review, 
23, 393-404. 
Sanne, J. (2001, September). Creating trust in air traffic control. Paper presented at 
the Human Issues in Aviation System, Toulouse. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour. 
In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations (2nd 
ed., pp. 7-24). Chicago: Nelson-Hall. 
Turner, J. C. (1987). Rediscovering the social group:  A self-categorisation theory. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Westrum, R. (1995). Organisational dynamics and safety. In N. McDonald, N. 
Johnston & R. Fuller (Eds.), Applications of psychology to the aviation system. 
Aldershot: Avebury. 
Worchel, P. (1979). Trust and distrust. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The 
social psychology of intergroup relations. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Zacharatos, A., Barling, J., & Iverson, R. (In press). High-performance work systems 
and occupational safety. Journal of Applied Psychology. 
Zand, D. E. (1972). Trust and managerial problem solving. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 17, 229-239. 
